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Harmful Help: The Costs of Backing-Up Behavior in Teams
Christopher M. Barnes, John R. Hollenbeck, and
David T. Wagner
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D. Scott DeRue
University of Michigan
Jennifer D. Nahrgang and Kelly M. Schwind
Michigan State University
Prior research on backing-up behavior has indicated that it is beneficial to teams (C. O. L. H. Porter,
2005; C. O. L. H. Porter et al., 2003). This literature has focused on how backing-up behavior aids backup
recipients in tasks in which workload is unevenly distributed among team members. The authors of the
present study examined different contexts of workload distribution and found that, in addition to the
initial benefits to backup recipients, there are initial and subsequent costs. Backing-up behavior leads
backup providers to neglect their own taskwork, especially when workload is evenly distributed. Team
members who receive high amounts of backing-up behavior decrease their taskwork in a subsequent task,
especially when a team member can observe their workload. These findings indicate that it is important
to consider both the benefits and costs of engaging in backing-up behavior.
Keywords: team performance, backing-up behavior, helping behavior, workload, dependence
Dickinson and McIntyre (1997, p. 19) noted that “a critical
feature of teams is that individuals must coordinate their decisions
and activities.” Many team researchers have found that teamwork
behaviors, such as coordination, communication, and information
sharing, are beneficial for performance (e.g., Johnson et al., 2006;
Marks, DeChurch, Mathieu, Panzer, & Alonso, 2005; Marks,
Zaccaro, & Mathieu, 2000; Montoya-Weiss, Massey, & Song,
2001; Moon et al., 2004). One type of teamwork behavior that
researchers have recently examined is backing-up behavior, which
has been defined as “the discretionary provision of resources and
task-related effort to another member of one’s team that is in-
tended to help that team member obtain the goals as defined by his
or her role” (Porter et al., 2003, p. 391).
In two empirical studies, Porter (2005) and Porter et al. (2003)
found that when teams had a member with a large amount of
workload, backing-up behavior was positively related to team
performance. This finding has led to the assumption that it is
beneficial for teams to engage in backing-up behavior. We con-
tend, however, that backing-up behavior has costs as well as
benefits. Specifically, we contend that backing-up behavior uti-
lizes the cognitive resources of backup providers and, thus, leaves
them with fewer resources to conduct their own taskwork. This
finding is consistent with contentions by Bowers, Braun, and
Morgan (1997) and MacMillan, Entin, and Serfaty (2004) that
communication and coordination represent an overhead cost for
team members. We contend that, because of this effect, backing-up
behavior can result in neglected taskwork on the part of the
individual who provides the backup. In contrast to the assumption
that backing-up behavior is always good for team performance,
this view suggests that it can be harmful in some circumstances.
In addition to this initial cost, we contend, there are subse-
quent costs of backing-up behavior. Building from theory and
research on dependence (Lee, 1997; Wells, Glickhauf-Hughes,
& Jones, 1999) and social loafing (Erez & Somech, 1996; Karau
& Williams, 1993), we contend that backup recipients can come
to rely on backup provided by their team members, such that
recipients will decrease their own taskwork. Thus, team mem-
bers who provide backing-up behavior can enable the dependence of
backup recipients. Moreover, because teams make decisions in a
social context, we examine how this relationship is altered by the
presence or absence of a team member who can observe help recipient
workload.
Accordingly, our purpose in this paper is to further examine
the relationship between backing-up behavior and team perfor-
mance; our focus is on the initial and subsequent costs of
backing-up behavior. Drawing from Porter et al.’s (2003) guid-
ance, which indicates the importance of both backup recipients
and backup providers, we examine costs of backing-up behavior
to each of these roles. Specifically, we examine the initial cost
of backup provider neglected taskwork and the subsequent cost
of decreased backup recipient taskwork, as well as moderators
of these effects. Additionally, we examine how help provider
neglected taskwork and help recipient taskwork influence team
performance.
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The Influence of Neglected Taskwork on Team
Performance
Previous research examining backing-up behavior has focused
on the benefits that are provided to backup recipients (Porter,
2005; Porter et al., 2003). This research has indicated that
backing-up behavior can prevent backup recipients from becoming
overloaded, to the point that they will fail in their role in the team.
The logic presented by Porter and colleagues indicates that
backing-up behavior aids backup recipients in the process of
completing the taskwork assigned to them, which in turn aids team
performance. Though Porter and colleagues did not directly test
the contention that backup recipient completed taskwork is related
to team performance, this contention is consistent with their find-
ing that backing-up behavior is positively related to team perfor-
mance.
As further noted by Porter et al. (2003), researchers who exam-
ine backing-up behavior should consider the roles of both backup
recipients and backup providers. Following their own advice,
Porter et al. examined the influence of backup provider personality
on the provision of backing-up behavior, as well as the way that
backing-up behavior given by providers influences team perfor-
mance. However, Porter et al. did not consider how the way in
which backup providers perform their own taskwork relates to
team performance. This topic is important, because work teams
tend to assign portions of the team task to all team members,
including both backup recipients and backup providers. We con-
tend that, in tasks high in team interdependence, defined by Saave-
dra, Earley, and Van Dyne (1993) as those in which group mem-
bers jointly complete a task, the degree to which backup providers
complete or neglect their own taskwork is an important determi-
nant of team performance.
In summary, although previous research has indicated the im-
portance of taskwork completed by both backup providers and
backup recipients, researchers have not tested the hypotheses that
backup provider taskwork and backup recipient taskwork are pos-
itively related to team performance. Building from the logic noted
above, we examined these relationships with our first two hypoth-
eses.
Hypothesis 1: Backup provider neglected taskwork will be
negatively related to team performance.
Hypothesis 2: Backup recipient completed taskwork will be
positively related to team performance.
Initial Costs of Backing-Up Behavior
Because backup provider neglected taskwork is an important
determinant of team performance, it is important that we uncover
antecedents to backup provider neglected taskwork in order to
further theory on team performance and to aid organizations in
their management of teams. In this section, we draw from theory
on bounded rationality (March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1945) and
from Kanfer and Ackerman’s (1989) model of cognitive resource
allocation to contend that backing-up behavior is an important
determinant of backup provider neglected taskwork.
Simon (1945) and March and Simon (1958) posited that mem-
bers of organizations are subject to bounded rationality. Their
theory that members of organizations have limits to their own
cognitive processing capability has received strong empirical sup-
port across multiple disciplines (for a review, see Kahneman,
2003). This theory has important implications for team members
engaged in tasks that utilize their cognitive resources. Once cog-
nitive demands exceed the capacity of team members, at least
some portion of their taskwork will not be completed. Indeed, a
major purpose of backing-up behavior is to lend cognitive re-
sources to a team member who is overwhelmed with taskwork.
Building in part on theory and research that examined bounded
rationality, Kanfer and Ackerman (1989) generated a theory of
cognitive resource allocation. According to their theory, perfor-
mance is determined in large part by the amount of cognitive
resources that are allocated to a task. The amount of resources
allocated to a task is determined by the individual’s overall level of
resources, minus the portion of resources that are allocated off
task. Therefore, if we assume a static level of overall cognitive
resources, the dedication of a greater proportion of cognitive
resources to the task will lead to better performance than will the
allocation of a lower proportion of cognitive resources to the task.
Similarly, as a greater proportion of cognitive resources is devoted
away from the task, the individual’s performance on the focal task
will suffer. Although the Kanfer–Ackerman model was developed
at the individual level of analysis, we believe that this model has
important implications for teams. Teams have finite cognitive
resources and can devote these resources to their assigned task or
away from their assigned task. When teams allocate their cognitive
resources away from the tasks for which they are responsible, their
performance will suffer.
Consistent with this extension of the Kanfer and Ackerman
(1989) model of resource allocation to the team level of analysis is
the distinction between taskwork and teamwork made by Bowers
et al. (1997). They define taskwork as a team’s interaction with
tasks, tools, machines, and systems, whereas they define teamwork
as the interpersonal interactions among individuals that are neces-
sary for exchanging information, developing and maintaining com-
munication patterns, and coordinating actions. Both taskwork and
teamwork occupy the finite resources of teams and their members.
Therefore, under conditions of high levels of workload, devoting
more resources to teamwork means that fewer resources are avail-
able for taskwork.
Backing-up behavior requires communication among team
members, so that team members understand who needs backup and
who is able to offer backup (Burke, Weir, & Duncan, 1976; Porter
et al., 2003). To engage in backing-up behavior, teams must
coordinate their behavior in order to provide backup at the right
time, in the right manner, and in the right place. This evaluation
requires the utilization of some amount of information processing
resources by members of the team, who thereby consume infor-
mation processing resources that could otherwise be allocated to
taskwork behavior. Furthermore, communication processes, such
as turn taking in team discussions regarding backup (Diehl &
Stroebe, 1987, 1991) and conflict resolution regarding backup (De
Dreu & Weingart, 2003), can utilize team resources. Information
processing and coordination of efforts cause team members to
expend their resources on teamwork and thereby reduce the
amount of resources that are available for taskwork.
A major shortcoming of previous research on backing-up be-
havior is that past researchers have overlooked the negative ram-
ifications of backing-up behavior for the taskwork of backup
providers (Porter, 2005; Porter et al., 2003). Noting that team
member resources are finite, we posit that, ceteris paribus, when
backup providers engage in backing-up behavior designed to aid
their team members, the help providers will have fewer resources
to allocate toward their own taskwork. In other words, backup
providers who devote resources toward backing-up behaviors will
have fewer resources available with which to conduct their own
taskwork, which will result in neglected taskwork for the backup
provider. Therefore, we made the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Backing-up behavior will be positively related
to backup provider neglected taskwork.
Because backing-up behavior presents the initial cost of backup
provider neglected taskwork, an important question arises as to
how this cost can be minimized. We posit that an important
determinant of help provider neglected taskwork as a result of
backing-up behavior is the workload distribution within teams.
Huey and Wickens (1993) noted that teams are often confronted
with abnormal or emergency circumstances, in which they must
respond rapidly. An example would be a fire response team that is
notified of a forest fire outbreak. Its members face a transition
from a low level of workload to a high level of workload, once
they begin their response to the fire. This example indicates that
team workload is dynamic, such that it may sometimes be low and
sometimes be high.
Building from this logic, we contend that workload distributions
are dynamic as well, such that members within a team may have
low or high proportions of workload. For example, an Air Force
midflight refueling crew contains members who are responsible
for different tasks; it includes, among others, a pilot who controls
the course of the refueling plane and a boom operator who controls
the instrument that transfers fuel from the refueling plane to a
receiving plane. At takeoff and landing, the pilot has high levels of
workload. At those times, the boom operator has a relatively low
level of workload. During the process of transferring fuel from one
plane to another, the pilot’s level of workload is lower than it is
during takeoff and landing. However, at this time, the boom
operator has a high level of workload. Thus, at some points in time,
all team members may have relatively equivalent levels of work-
load, and, at other points in time, some team members may have
a greater level of workload than do others.
As noted by Porter (2005), there has been little empirical re-
search on backing-up behavior. The research that does exist on this
topic has tended to focus on contexts of uneven workload distri-
butions, in which one team member has a greater portion of the
workload than have other team members (e.g., Porter, 2005; Porter
et al., 2003). However, as noted above, workload distributions may
be evenly distributed, such that each team member has approxi-
mately the same amount of workload. Indeed, teams may pur-
posely assign taskwork in this manner, in hopes of preventing a
team member from becoming overloaded. We contend that team
workload distribution has important implications for neglected
taskwork by backup providers.
In even workload distributions, each team member has an equiv-
alent amount of workload. Providing backing-up behavior in such
contexts requires that backup providers reallocate their resources
away from their own workload, despite the fact that backup pro-
vider workloads are just as high as is that of the team member
seeking help. Furthermore, resources devoted to teamwork behav-
iors, such as communication and coordination, detract from re-
sources available for backup providers to conduct their own task-
work. Thus, the provision of backup behavior will come at the cost
of the provider’s own taskwork.
In contrast, in uneven workload distributions, one team member
has more workload than do the others. As indicated by Porter et al.
(2003), an uneven distribution generally results in team members
with the greater portion of workload taking on the role of backup
recipient and team members with the lesser portion of the work-
load taking on the role of backup provider. The lower level of
workload held by backup providers in uneven workload distribu-
tions means that they can reallocate their resources to another team
member with a lesser neglect of their own taskwork than can
providers in even workload distributions. In other words, com-
pared with backup providers in even workload distributions,
backup providers in uneven workload distributions will have lower
levels of neglected taskwork when they engage in backing-up
behavior. Accordingly, we made the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Workload distribution moderates the positive
relationship between backing-up behavior and backup pro-
vider neglected taskwork, such that an even team workload
distribution accentuates this relationship and an uneven team
workload distribution attenuates this relationship.
Subsequent Costs of Backing-Up Behavior
To date, researchers have focused on how backing-up behavior
benefits backup recipient performance in the task during which the
backup occurs (e.g., Porter et al., 2003; Porter, 2005). However,
this research has not considered longer term effects of the receipt
of backup. This is an important oversight, because, as research on
team norms (Ancona & Chong, 1996; Bettenhausen & Murnighan,
1985; Gersick & Hackman, 1990) indicates, behavior at one point
in time can influence future behavior. Accordingly, in this section
we consider the influence of the receipt of backing-up behavior on
later recipient behaviors.
Although previous research has not directly examined how team
backing-up behavior affects backup recipients, Lee (1997) has
suggested that seeking help may imply incompetence and depen-
dence. Furthermore, Fisher, Nadler, and Whitcheralagna (1982)
contended that the receipt of aid can be threatening for help
recipients. Research on dependency has indicated that dependent
individuals suffer from low self-esteem (Wells et al., 1999), low
self-confidence, and lost selfhood (Lindley, Giordano, & Hammer,
1999). Although the concept of dependency was originally applied
to dysfunctional families, the term is now applied to a wide variety
of relationships (Lindley et al., 1999). Building from this research,
we propose that depriving a member of a work team of the
opportunity to develop his or her skills by providing high levels of
backup to that individual will lead to negative self-evaluations and
lower feelings of self-worth. As indicated by Ilies and Judge
(2005), such negative feedback results in lower goals for future
tasks. Thus, individuals who receive high levels of backup from
their teams will interpret their own abilities as inadequate, which
will in turn lead to their decreased motivation in future tasks.
Complementing the research on dependence is theory and re-
search on social loafing. Social loafing is defined as the reduction
in individual motivation and effort by an individual who is work-
ing collectively, as compared with the motivation and effort the
individual exerts when working individually (Karau & Williams,
1993). Research on social loafing suggests that individuals engage
in such behavior because they lack a sense of accountability or
personal responsibility (Erez & Somech, 1996). These individuals
sense that, regardless of whether they substantively participate in
working towards group goals, they will be able to enjoy the
benefits of team performance.
As indicated by a meta-analysis conducted by Karau and Wil-
liams (1993), group environments that facilitate a lack of account-
ability will be especially prone to social loafing. As noted above,
research on dependency indicates that receipt of help can lead to a
sense of lost selfhood (Lindley et al., 1999). To the extent that
individuals consistently and repeatedly receive help on their own
work tasks, we expect that a sense of dependence will develop,
such that backup recipients will no longer feel personally account-
able. Rather, they will view their own taskwork as work that can
be allocated to the group as a whole. This diminished sense of
accountability will impact individual motivation and result in
increased social loafing. In addition, meta-analytic evidence sug-
gests, social loafing is fomented when individuals perceive that
their contributions are not unique (Karau & Williams, 1993); this
perception leads them to think that the exertion of effort will result
merely in duplication of effort by another team member (George,
1992). On the basis of this research, we propose that team mem-
bers who receive large amounts of backup will perceive low levels
of unique contributions, a lack of accountability, and decreased
instrumentality for their effort and will therefore engage in social
loafing.
In summary, we build from research on team member depen-
dence and social loafing to make the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Team members who receive high levels of
backup will engage in lower levels of taskwork in future tasks
than will team members who receive low levels of backup.
As mentioned above, Porter et al. (2003) noted the importance
of both backup providers and backup recipients. As Hypothesis 5
indicates, backup providers can enable backup recipients to be-
come dependent upon backup given by providers. However, we
contend that this effect depends on the decision process of backup
providers. As noted by Porter et al., an important criterion that
backup providers utilize in deciding whether to engage in
backing-up behavior is the legitimacy of need for backup. Porter et
al. defined legitimacy of need for backup as the ratio of resources
to workload. Team members who have a high ratio of resources to
workload have a low legitimacy of need and vice versa. Backup
providers are most likely to provide backup when they perceive
that backup recipients have a legitimate need. Porter et al. provided
empirical support for their contention and found that legitimacy of
need for backup was positively related to backing-up behavior.
Porter et al.’s (2003) research was an important first step in
explaining how help providers decide to engage in backing-up
behavior. However, their research focused on backing-up behav-
ior, as provided by individual team members, and overlooked the
social processes inherent in team contexts. We contend that backup
providers do not reach their decisions regarding legitimacy of need
in isolation. Rather, team members influence each other as they
make their decisions regarding legitimacy of need. To enrich
theory and research examining backing-up behavior, research must
include these social influences.
In a series of studies investigating collective induction, Laughlin
(1986, 1988, 1999) contended that the manner in which groups
make decisions depends in part on the nature of the task. Specif-
ically, the number of group members that is necessary and suffi-
cient for the group to reach a correct decision is inversely propor-
tional to the demonstrability of the solution (Laughlin, 1986;
Laughlin & Hollingshead, 1995). In other words, the more that
group members are able to demonstrate the correctness of a solu-
tion, the smaller the number of group members that will be
necessary to convince the group to adopt the correct solution. For
tasks that are high in demonstrability, such as an algebra problem,
group members can demonstrate why their solution is the correct
one. In the example of an algebra problem, the group member with
the correct solution can unambiguously show the derivation step
by step. Laughlin, Kerr, Munch, and Haggarty (1976) referred to
high demonstrability tasks as “eureka” or “insight” tasks. In this
type of task, the correct answer is immediately evident and is
accepted when it is proposed by any group member (Laughlin et
al., 1976). Laughlin (1986) and Laughlin and Shippy (1983)
showed that a model they labeled “truth wins” best describes how
groups adopt a solution in such tasks, such that if proposed by one
member, correct solutions were typically recognized either on the
trial on which they were proposed or on a subsequent trial.
On the low end of the demonstrability scale are judgmental
tasks. Judgmental tasks are evaluative, behavioral, or aesthetic
judgments for which no answer is immediately demonstrably
correct (Laughlin, 1986; Laughlin & Adamopoulos, 1980). At the
time the decision is made, the accuracy of the outcome of a
judgmental task is not clearly demonstrable.
For tasks that are low in demonstrability, such as judging the
quality of an ice skating competition, it is not possible for a team
member to demonstrate unambiguously why his or her score is the
correct solution. Therefore, in low demonstrability tasks, a single
team member is not generally sufficient to convince the group to
adopt a judgment. On such judgment tasks, the basic social com-
bination process is one that Laughlin and Shippy (1983) labeled
“majority wins,” in which the group simply adopts the solution
proposed by the majority of the group members.
According to Laughlin and Adamopoulos (1980), there is an
additional type of task that is somewhat demonstrable but is too
complex to be a eureka-type task. These tasks are still toward the
high demonstrability end of the scale, where there is a correct
solution that can be demonstrated to others. However, multiple
solutions exist that initially may be considered viable, and the
correct solution is not immediately accepted as evidence. Such
tasks fit what Laughlin and Adamopoulos labeled the “truth sup-
ported wins” model, in which the individual who proposes the
correct solution needs the support of at least one other group
member in order to convince the group. In other words, in truth
supported wins tasks, two correct members are generally necessary
and sufficient for a correct group response (Laughlin & Shippy,
1983). Ellis, Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Porter, West, and Moon (2003)
conducted a laboratory experiment that provided support for the
truth supported wins model.
As Porter et al. (2003) have noted, the task of deciding whether
a team member has a legitimate need for help involves a consid-
eration of the amount of workload and resources held by potential
backup recipients. We contend that this decision task fits best into
the category of one that is somewhat demonstrable but too com-
plex to be a eureka-type task. Team members can indicate how
much workload and resources they have, but there may be multiple
solutions that may initially be considered to be viable. A team
member who requests help may initially receive the alternative
proposition that there is not a legitimate need for help (e.g., “no, do
your own work”) or perhaps even the proposition that the team
member he or she is requesting help from has an even greater need
(e.g., “no, you help me!”). Following collective induction theory,
as indicated by Laughlin and Adamopoulos (1980), team members
who request backup will be more likely to receive backup if a team
member can support their contention that they have a legitimate
need for backup. We refer to team members who can support this
contention as backup advocates.
We contend that backup advocates will facilitate the dependence
of backup recipients upon their team members. As noted by
Hypothesis 5, team members who receive high levels of
backing-up behavior in an initial task will engage in lower levels
of taskwork in later tasks. When backup advocates observe a
buildup in the backup recipient’s workload and support the request
for backup, recipients will be more likely to rely on backup
provided by their team members. In such contexts, the negative
influence of the receipt of backup on recipient taskwork will be
especially strong. In contrast, when there is no backup advocate to
support recipient requests for backup, recipients will be less able to
rely upon the backup of their team members and will therefore
complete more of their own taskwork. Thus, we made the follow-
ing hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6: The presence of a backup advocate will mod-
erate the influence of the receipt of backup on the backup
recipient’s future taskwork, such that this relationship will be
accentuated when a backup advocate is present and attenuated
when there is no backup advocate.
Overview of Studies
To test our hypotheses, we conducted two studies. Study 1
examined the initial costs of backing-up behavior by investigating
the influence of backing-up behavior on backup provider neglected
taskwork during the task. Study 2 examined the subsequent costs
of backing-up behavior by investigating the influence of
backing-up behavior (Time 1) on the backup recipient (Time 2).
Study 1
Method
Participants
Participants were 272 undergraduate students in an upper level
management course at a large midwestern university who were
randomly assigned to 4-person teams (N  68 teams). Participa-
tion in the study was voluntary; however, in exchange for their
participation, these students received course credit. In addition,
teams were eligible for cash prizes ($40 per team) on the basis of
team performance.
Nature of the Task
Participants worked on a dynamic and networked computer
simulation, which was a modified version of the distributed dy-
namic decision making (DDD) simulation developed for the De-
partment of Defense for use in research and training. The version
of the simulation we used was developed for teams whose mem-
bers had little or no military experience. We provide a brief
description of the simulation below (see Beersma, Hollenbeck,
Humphrey, Moon, & Conlon, 2003, for further details).
All team members sat at networked computer terminals that
were located in the same room. During the simulation, the team
monitored a hypothetical geographic region, kept enemy forces
from moving into the restricted areas, and allowed friendly forces
to move about freely. Radar representations of the forces moving
through the geographic space the team monitored were known as
“tracks.” The overall objective was to disable enemy tracks as
quickly as possible, if they entered the restricted airspace, and to
avoid disabling friendly tracks. The task was structured such that
the team operated in a divisional resource allocation structure,
meaning that each team member was able to engage and disable
any enemy track that encroached on his or her geographic region.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to both a 4-person team
and to one of four computer stations, each corresponding to one
quadrant of the screen. Training consisted of declarative knowl-
edge regarding all the various details involved in playing the
simulation and hands-on training, during which the trainer explic-
itly walked the participants through the mechanics of the simula-
tion. The teams were also allowed hands-on practice. Following
this training, each team completed a 30-min iteration of the sim-
ulation.
Manipulations and Measures
Workload distribution. This study examined teams in the con-
texts of even and uneven workload distributions. Accordingly, we
created two conditions. In the uneven workload distribution, 1
team member (whom we refer to as the backup recipient) was
intentionally given a disproportionately heavier workload com-
pared with other members of the team. Specifically, the backup
recipients had 50% of the team’s workload (72 tracks), and the
remaining 3 team members (whom we refer to as the backup
providers) evenly split the other 50% of the team’s workload (24
tracks each). In the even workload distribution, each team member
received an identical number of tracks (36 tracks each). Thus, the
overall workload was the same for both conditions (144 tracks).
Moreover, both conditions utilized identical types of tracks; they
arrived at the same time in both conditions and moved in the same
direction. The difference between the conditions was that track
paths were simply reflected on their axes, so that 36 of the tracks
that entered the quadrants of the backup providers in the even
condition entered the quadrant of the backup receiver in the
uneven condition.
Backing-up behavior. As discussed by Porter et al. (2003),
backing-up behavior can generally be defined as the extent to
which team members help each other perform their roles. In this
task, each team member is individually responsible for protecting
one of four quadrants of the restricted zone; however, all team
members are collectively responsible for protecting the entire
restricted zone as a team. As we noted, in the uneven condition, the
backup receiver had the heaviest share of the team’s workload. For
this study, we calculated backing-up behaviors as the total number
of times that team members other than the backup recipient en-
gaged and cleared an enemy track found within the backup recip-
ient’s quadrant. This is a sound operationalization of backing-up
behavior because it (a) exploits our ability to objectively measure
actual helping behaviors and (b) measures only behaviors directed
toward the backup recipient. Furthermore, this measure of
backing-up behavior is identical to an objective measure previ-
ously established in the literature (Porter, 2005; Porter et al.,
2003).
Backup provider neglected taskwork. Backup provider ne-
glected taskwork was operationalized as an objective count of the
number of times an enemy track appeared in the quadrant of any
of the backup providers and was not disabled.
Backup recipient completed taskwork. Backup recipient com-
pleted taskwork was operationalized as an objective count of the
number of times the backup recipient disabled an enemy track.
Team performance. Each team started the simulation with
50,000 points, lost 1 point for each second that any unfriendly
track was in the restricted zone, and lost 2 points per second for
each unfriendly track in the highly restricted zone. The teams lost
300 points for disabling any friendly track. This measure of team
performance is identical to that used in prior research (Hollenbeck
et al., 2002; Moon et al., 2004).
Results
Means, standard deviations, and between-team correlations are
given in Table 1. Backing-up behavior was strongly correlated
with workload distribution, which indicates that teams with uneven
workloads were more likely to demonstrate backing-up behaviors.
Furthermore, team performance was strongly (negatively) corre-
lated with workload distribution, such that teams with uneven
workloads performed worse than did teams with even workloads.
Hypothesis 1 stated the expectation that backup provider ne-
glected taskwork would be negatively related to team performance,
and Hypothesis 2 stated the expectation that backup recipient
completed taskwork would be positively related to team perfor-
mance. Table 2 indicates that, when we controlled for workload
distribution, backup provider neglected taskwork significantly pre-
dicted team performance in the direction hypothesized (  .51,
p  .01), as did backup recipient completed taskwork (  .34,
p  .01). Thus, Hypotheses 1 and 2 were supported.
Hypothesis 3 stated the expectation that backing-up behavior
would be positively related to backup provider neglected taskwork.
Table 1 indicates a significant negative correlation between
backing-up behavior and backup provider neglected taskwork (r
.27, p  .05). This correlation supports Hypothesis 3. Hypoth-
esis 4 stated the expectation that workload distribution would
moderate the relationship between backing-up behavior and ne-
glected taskwork. Table 3 indicates that the interaction signifi-
cantly predicted neglected taskwork (B  1.53, p  .05). More-
over, the form of the interaction noted in Figure 1 matches that
indicated by Hypothesis 4. Specifically, the positive relationship
between backing-up behavior and backup provider neglected task-
work was stronger in the even workload distribution than in the
uneven workload distribution. Indeed, the slope for the uneven
workload distribution condition was not significantly different
from zero ( p  .28). This result provides empirical support for
Hypothesis 4.
Study 2
Method
Procedure
To examine subsequent effects of backing-up behavior, we
conducted a second laboratory experiment with the teams from
Table 1
Study 1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Interteam Correlations
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5
1. Team performance 40,103.81 3,130.74 —
2. Backing-up behavior 12.60 11.95 .59** —
3. Workload distributiona 0.56 0.50 .71** .81** —
4. Backup provider neglected taskwork 28.37 5.49 .27* .27* .27* —
5. Backup recipient completed taskwork 31.29 8.52 .05 .17 .32* .04 —
Note. N  68 teams.
a Dummy coded 0  even, 1  uneven.
* p  .05 (two-tailed). ** p  .01 (two-tailed).
Table 2
Study 1 Hierarchical Regression Analyses Regressing Team
Performance on Backup Provider Neglected Taskwork and
Backup Recipient Completed Taskwork
Predictor
Team performance
Step 1 Step 2
Workload distribution .71** .95**
Backup provider neglected taskwork .51**
Backup recipient completed taskwork .34**
R2 .50** .83**
R2, Step 2 .33**
Note. Values represent standardized regression coefficients. N  68
teams.
** p  .01 (two-tailed).
Study 1. These teams engaged in the same DDD task as that
utilized in Study 1. Following the first iteration of the simulation
from Study 1, each team had 10 min to plan prior to a second
iteration of the simulation. Following this planning session, each
team engaged in the second iteration for 30 min.
Manipulations and Measures
Backup recipient completed taskwork. To examine the change
in backup recipient completed taskwork, we measured backup
recipient completed taskwork in both iterations of the simulation.
Task 1 backup recipient completed taskwork was operationalized
as the number of times the backup recipient had successfully
disabled an enemy track in the first iteration of the simulation.
Task 2 backup recipient completed taskwork was operationalized
in the same manner but for the second iteration of the simulation.
Backing-up behavior. We utilized the same measure for
backing-up behavior in this study as that used in Study 1. Specif-
ically, we calculated backing-up behavior as the total number of
times that team members other than the backup recipient had
engaged and cleared an enemy track found within the backup
recipient’s quadrant.
Workload distribution. Workload distribution was manipu-
lated in the same manner as in Study 1, such that teams were
randomly placed into either an even workload distribution or an
uneven workload distribution.
Backup advocate. This variable was manipulated, such that
teams were randomly placed into one of two conditions: backup
advocate present or no backup advocate present. This variable was
manipulated through the placement of tracks in the help recipient
quadrant. In both conditions, the team members responsible for the
southwestern and southeastern quadrants could not see the tracks
placed in the backup recipient’s quadrant without sending one of
their assets to that region to investigate. However, depending on
the condition, the team member responsible for the northeastern
quadrant was or was not able to see the tracks placed in the backup
recipient’s quadrant.
In the backup advocate present condition, tracks in this quadrant
were placed in a location in which the team member responsible
for the northeastern quadrant could automatically see the tracks
without taking any action. In the no backup advocate present
condition, these tracks were placed in a location in which the team
member responsible for the northeastern quadrant could not see the
tracks, unless he or she specifically took the time to send an asset
to that location to gather information. In other words, a backup
provider (the backup advocate) could passively see the amount of
recipient workload in the backup advocate present condition, but
no backup providers could passively see the amount of recipient
workload in the no backup advocate condition.
Team performance. Team performance was measured in
Study 2 in the same manner as in Study 1. Each team started the
simulation with 50,000 points and lost 1 point for each second that
any unfriendly track was in the restricted zone, 2 points per second
for each unfriendly track in the highly restricted zone, and 300
points for disabling any friendly track.
Results
Means, standard deviations, and between-team correlations are
given in Table 4. Similar to Study 1, backing-up behavior was
strongly correlated with workload distribution in Study 2, which
indicates that teams with uneven workloads were more likely to
demonstrate backing-up behaviors. Also similar to Study 1 was the
strong negative correlation between workload distribution and
team performance.
Hypothesis 5 stated that backing-up behavior conducted early in
a team’s life span would be negatively related to backup recipient
completed taskwork in a later task. As indicated by Table 5,
backing-up behavior at Time 1 significantly predicts backup re-
cipient completed taskwork at Time 2 (standardized   .25,
p  .05). This finding supports Hypothesis 5.
Hypothesis 6 states that the presence of a backup advocate
would moderate the relationship between backing-up behavior
conducted early in a team’s life span and backup recipient com-
pleted taskwork in a later task. Results indicated that the presence
(or absence) of a backup advocate significantly interacted with
backup received at Time 1 in predicting backup recipient com-
pleted taskwork at Time 2 (standardized   .27, p  .05; see
Table 5). Figure 2, which indicates the form of the interaction,
shows that the presence of a backup advocate magnified the
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Figure 1. The moderating role of workload distribution on the relation-
ship between backing-up behavior and backup provider neglected task-
work.
Table 3
Study 1 Hierarchical Regression Analyses Regressing Team
Performance on Backing-Up Behavior and Workload
Distribution
Predictor
Backup provider
neglected taskwork
Step 1 Step 2
Workload distribution 0.15 1.11*
Backing-up behavior 0.15 2.04*
Backing-Up Behavior  Workload Distribution 1.53*
R2 0.08 0.15*
R2, Step 2 .07*
Note. Values represent unstandardized regression coefficients. N  68
teams.
* p  .05 (two-tailed).
negative effect of backing-up behavior on subsequent backup
recipient completed taskwork, as shown by the large negative
slope, whereas the absence of a backup advocate nullified any
effect of backing-up behavior at Time 1 on backup recipient
completed taskwork at Time 2. These findings are consistent with
our predictions and thus support Hypothesis 6.
General Discussion
As the results indicate, all six of the hypothesized relationships
were supported. Taskwork completed by backup providers and
taskwork completed by backup recipients were both significantly
related to team performance, a finding that indicates the impor-
tance of taskwork completed by both of these roles. Our results
indicate that backing-up behavior leads to both initial and subse-
quent costs to taskwork. Specifically, backing-up behavior was
positively related to backup provider neglected taskwork. How-
ever, this negative relationship was moderated by workload dis-
tribution, such that backing-up behavior had an especially strong
relationship with backup provider neglected taskwork when team
workload was evenly distributed. Additionally, backing-up behav-
ior at Time 1 was negatively related to backup recipient completed
taskwork at Time 2, and this relationship was especially strong
when a backup advocate was present.
Implications for Theory and Practice
This study further enriches theory on the topic of backing-up
behavior by including a more nuanced depiction of backing-up
behavior over the course of time. Mitchell and James (2001) and
Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, and Tushman (2001) have made
explicit calls for researchers to give greater consideration to time
in their theory and research. We heed this advice by examining
both the initial and subsequent costs of backing-up behavior.
Previous research has indicated that backing-up behavior has the
initial benefit of aiding backup recipients (Porter et al., 2003). As
a result, team researchers and managers of teams were left with the
assumption that teams should be encouraged to engage in
backing-up behavior. However, there are initial costs that can
occur from engaging in backing-up behaviors. Backup providers
who allocate their resources toward backing up other team mem-
bers may neglect their own taskwork. This cost is minimized when
teams have uneven workload distributions, which indicates that
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Figure 2. The moderating role of a backup advocate on the relationship
between backing-up behavior and change in backup recipient completed
taskwork.
Table 4
Study 2 Means, Standard Deviations, and Interteam Correlations
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Team performance 43,130.3 2,162.97 —
2. Study 1 backing-up behavior 12.60 11.95 .21 —
3. Study 2 workload distributiona 0.63 0.49 .57** .36** —
4. Presence of backup advocateb 0.31 0.47 .16 .10 .51** —
5. Study 1 backup recipient completed taskwork 31.29 8.52 .20 .17 .03 .10 —
6. Study 2 backup recipient completed taskwork 36.00 9.89 .26* .48** .55** .22 .45** —
Note. N  68 teams.
a Dummy coded 0  even, 1  uneven.
b Dummy coded 0  no backup advocate present, 1  backup advocate present.
* p  .05 (two-tailed). ** p  .01 (two-tailed).
Table 5
Study 2 Hierarchical Regression Analyses Regressing Backup
Recipient Completed Taskwork (Time 2) on Backing-Up
Behavior (Time 1) and Backup Advocate (Time 2)
Predictor
Study 2 backup recipient
completed taskwork
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Study 1 backup recipient
completed taskwork
.44** .40** .38**
Study 2 workload distributiona .54** .44** .52**
Presence of backup advocateb .01 .04
Study 1 backing-up behavior .25* .07
Study 1 Backing-Up Behavior 
Presence of Backup Advocate .27*
R2 .50* .55* .59*
R2, Step 2 .05*
R2, Step 3 .04*
Note. Values represent standardized regression coefficients. N  68
teams.
a Dummy coded 0  even, 1  uneven.
b Dummy coded 0  no backup advocate present, 1  backup advocate
present.
* p  .05 (two-tailed). ** p  .01 (two-tailed).
teams may benefit overall from engaging in backing-up behavior
in such contexts. In contrast, the costs of backup provider ne-
glected taskwork are especially high when teams have even work-
load distributions, which indicates that teams may suffer overall if
they engage in backing-up behavior when team members have
equivalent workloads. Thus, theory considering backing-up behav-
ior must be updated to include this important contextual influence.
Moreover, our study contributes to this literature by examining
how backing-up behavior provided early in a team’s life span
influences taskwork in later tasks. This effect is perhaps more
insidious and thus more difficult for teams to anticipate. Even if
backing-up behavior is provided in legitimate contexts that mini-
mize the costs to providers and maximize initial benefit to the
team, it can come at the subsequent cost of decreased backup
recipient motivation and taskwork. Thus, it is clear that researchers
who examine the topic of backing-up behavior should consider
both initial and subsequent effects of this behavior.
Researchers and managers of teams should keep these findings
in mind when training teams. Our data suggest that teams should
not be trained to unconditionally engage in backing-up behavior.
We suggest that an important part of this training is that teams
should be trained to recognize different types of workload distri-
butions, such that they can provide backup only when it is war-
ranted. Teams with such training can engage in backing-up behav-
ior only when the situation calls for it.
Similarly, managers of teams should keep these findings in mind
when they conduct performance appraisals. Research indicates that
managers take into account extrarole behaviors—such as helping
behavior—in performance appraisals, such that individuals who
engage in greater levels of helping are generally rated higher than
are those who perform fewer extrarole behaviors. To the extent to
which performance appraisals reinforce past positive behavior, we
expect that positively rated behaviors would become more likely in
the future. This reinforcing effect suggests that if managers rate
team members in part on the basis of backing-up behavior, they
may encourage team members to engage in backing-up behavior,
even when such actions may be detrimental to team performance.
Strengths and Limitations
There are two primary strengths to the design of this study. First,
all of our variables were objectively measured. This design ele-
ment stands in contrast to much of the literature on helping
behavior, which generally relies upon supervisor ratings or self-
reports. Objective measurement of the variables involved helped
us to avoid methodological problems associated with self-report
data. Second, we were able to objectively manipulate workload
distributions in a manner that is nearly impossible to do in a field
setting.
The fact that this study was conducted in a laboratory context
may evoke questions regarding the external validity of the find-
ings. Participants in this study were not randomly selected from
any definable population but rather were college students who
volunteered for the study. A second limitation that concerns the
external validity of our findings relates to the task used in the
current study. Although we believe that this task is representative
of many kinds of interdependent team tasks that have a speed–
accuracy trade-off (including the tasks that manufacturing teams,
emergency medical teams, pit crews, air traffic controllers, and
weapons directors need to perform), we technically cannot gener-
alize the parameter estimates found in this study to all other tasks,
because we did not select the task randomly from the entire
population of team tasks. However, prior research has suggested
that participants who engage in the task used in the current study
do find it psychologically engaging (Hollenbeck et al., 2002).
Moreover, participants were aware of the financial bonus that
could be achieved by performing well on the task and were
interested in winning the bonus money.
When assessing the relevance of external validity, Mook (1983)
noted that one needs to keep the nature of the research question in
mind. In this particular study, we were less interested in actual
command and control situations than we were in developing and
testing a model of backing-up behavior in teams. There are no
boundary conditions or formal aspects of our conceptual model
that would imply that the predicted relationships would not work
in this specific context. Therefore, this context provides a legiti-
mate venue within which to test theory. If the theory failed to work
in this context, we would need to revise the theory to reflect unique
aspects of this context. Moreover, Anderson, Lindsay, and Bush-
man (1999) noted that the correlation between effect sizes obtained
in laboratory settings and field settings generally exceeds .70, a
finding that indicates the similarity between hypothesis tests using
field and laboratory studies.
Implications for Future Research
Future research should examine other conditions that alter the
cost and benefit of engaging in backing-up behavior. Other con-
textual influences may be relevant to the cost and benefit of
engaging in backing-up behavior. For example, it is likely that type
of task is relevant, such that teams performing conjunctive tasks
would benefit when the least capable member received backup,
and teams performing disjunctive tasks would likely suffer when
the most capable member engaged in backing-up behavior. Addi-
tionally, we suspect that individual differences may be relevant.
For example, individuals high in ability may be better able to
provide backup without a significant increase in their neglected
taskwork.
Another important avenue for future research is the examination
of other factors that can influence the strength of the influence of
backing-up behavior on backup recipient taskwork conducted in
future tasks. This is an especially important topic, because it is
often necessary for teams to be able to engage in backing-up
behavior when a legitimate need arises. As our study indicates,
such teams will need to trade initial benefits for subsequent costs.
However, researchers may find that characteristics of either the
context or the team can mitigate this negative subsequent cost.
Researchers may be able to draw further from research that exam-
ines dependency to determine how teams can provide backup
without leading backup recipients to become dependent upon this
aid.
Our study indicates that backup advocates can facilitate the
dependence of backup recipients; thus, it highlights the contribu-
tion of backup advocates to a negative outcome associated with
backing-up behavior. However, future research may reveal that
having a backup advocate can also be associated with positive
outcomes. For example, it may be that backup advocates can
provide the benefit of ensuring that those who legitimately need
backup are able to convince the rest of the team to allocate
resources to them. In other words, in addition to finding, as we did,
that the presence of a backup advocate can magnify the negative
effects of receipt of backup, future researchers may find that the
presence of a backup advocate can magnify other effects that are
positive rather than negative.
Finally, just as our research has examined both initial and
subsequent costs of backing-up behavior, future research should
add to current theory, which examines the initial benefits of
backing-up behavior by examining subsequent benefits of
backing-up behavior. It may be that backing-up behavior provided
early in a team’s life span aids in the development of trust and
cohesion at later points in time. It is clear from our study that time
is an important factor in determining the effects of backing-up
behavior. This knowledge should be applied both to recipients and
providers and to benefits and costs, and it should be applied over
initial and subsequent tasks.
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